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POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE RUSSIAN PEASANT AND AUTOCRACY

I

YEARs ago one could find occasionally in Russian peasant huts pictures of Louis Napoleon, carefully cut out from a daily newspaper or from a weekly and nailed on the wall, perhaps side by side with a cheap chromo of Alexander II, in whose reign serfdom was abolished. But spread more widely than the pictures of Louis Napoleon was a curious tale, simple in its nature but deep in its meaning. After the allied armies had taken Sebastopol and had won the Crimean campaign, the young Tsar Alexander Nikolaevitch, according to the story, sought peace from Louis Napoleon. And to the young Russian tsar the emperor of the French said: Peace you can have, but on one condition: you must solemnly swear to free your own long-suffering Russian people from serfdom and bitter iniquity.

Naive is this tale; but the popular mind was certainly not far astray in connecting the fall of Sebastopol with the abolition of serfdom. The Crimean campaign made it clear to every cultivated Russian, as well as to the more enlightened elements in and around the winter palace, that the empire was so thoroughly incapacitated by its own institutions, based on serfdom, that Russia must either be reorganized or face the consequences of its misrule. Soon after peace was signed, Alexander II, in March, 1856, addressed the nobility of Moscow, and in this address it was officially intimated for the first time that serfdom must be abolished. "It is better," he said, "to abolish serfdom from

above than wait till it shall abolish itself from below."¹ It was in accordance with this wise prevision that the imperial government officially abolished serfdom on February 19, 1861.

To-day, forty-five years after the emancipation, we still hear throughout the empire the old cry: "Land and liberty." And if it were merely a cry! Cries can be suppressed in Holy Russia. But estates are being pillaged, manors are afire, and the peasantry is becoming an integral part of the nation and is getting ready to answer the bugle-call of the revolution.

There were times when the old governmental wisdom worked well. The recipe was simple: "Russia must be kept frozen, that it may not get putrid."² The peasantry—or, to speak more accurately, the ignorance of the peasantry—was regarded as the corner-stone and foundation of the throne, and especial care was taken that this class should not become "contaminated" by West European culture, in fact by any culture. It remained ignorant. Arrayed in uniform the ignorant peasant was called upon to fight for the Manchurian adventure of Emperor Nikolas II, and he died as ignorant of the ends for which he was dying as he was ignorant of those for which he had lived. Is it not a pathetic comment on the tsar's government that Russian soldiers, as prisoners of war, were taught to read and to write Russian by the Japanese?

Yet the notion is widespread that the Russian autocracy is particularly democratic, for in every imperial manifesto addressed to the peasantry the assurance can be found that the peasants are especially near to the heart of the emperor and that their needs are his special care. And until very recently the vast bulk of the peasant body firmly believed that the tsar was with them, but that the officials and the nobility kept the tsar from exercising his good will and bestowing his bounty upon them.

Is there no truth in this legend? It is a part of Russian popular tradition, and like all folklore it is an interpretation of an historical reality, of a political situation antedating the intro-

¹ *Materiali k istorii unichtozhenia krepostnago prava v carstvovanii Alexandra II* (St. Petersburg, 1860), vol. i, p. 214.

² Simkhovitch, "An Interpretation of Autocracy," in *The International Quarterly*, October, 1904, pp. 1-12.

duction of serfdom. Like so many popular sayings it came down from generation to generation, losing connection with the facts that supported it, generalized in oral transmission, sanctified by time, till it was finally viewed by the good-natured and illiterate peasant as a political axiom.

The origin of this legend unquestionably dates back to the period preceding the establishment of autocracy in Russia. It is an interpretation of the actual policy of the Muscovite grand dukes in the sixteenth century, which consisted in ruthless extermination of the feudal aristocracy. Little love was wasted by the peasantry on their feudal lords, and the bloody extermination of these lords by Ivan the Terrible particularly impressed the popular mind. Each and every ruthless deed was covered by the father of Russian autocracy either by a quotation from the scriptures, or by the word "treason" coupled with a melodramatic appeal to the common people. Ivan's picturesque figure was bound to impress itself upon the people's imagination; he became the hero of many a folksong, in which he was treated on the whole with sympathy. That was the origin of the legend.¹

Soon enough the peasantry found that the newly created landlord class, "the men of service," were considerably worse than the old feudal aristocracy. But the legend remained, cherished by the government even more than by the people. In recent times, when the imperial government needed an excuse for its existence, a *raison d'être* of autocracy in Russia, it brought forth this very legend of the peculiar closeness of the tsar to his people as a singular God-given national characteristic of Holy Russia, which could not suffer that an institution so foreign as a parliament should stand between the tsar's heart and his people. And the ignorance of the peasantry remained the foundation of the throne.

In the last two or three years of serfdom the old legend was revived. While many a nobleman was opposed to serfdom, the nobility as a class was naturally enough guided by its class interests, and its attitude toward the abolition of serfdom was as

¹ Milyoukov, *Russia and its Crisis*, pp. 353-355.

a whole unfriendly. The peasants coming in daily contact with their masters could not help noticing this fact. Rumors became current throughout the peasant world that the tsar was about to give them "land and freedom"; and for three or more years, while the reform measure was being prepared and elaborated, the abolition act was keenly awaited by every peasant throughout the empire. The day came, and the disappointment was bitter. The peasantry of many a place would have preferred serfdom to the status offered them. The "freedom" so feverishly expected, so fervently prayed for, had to be introduced only too often with the help of the military. In the official *Short History of the activity of the Department of the Interior for the twenty-five years 1855-1880*, we read that in the first two years after the publication of the abolition act, from February 19, 1861, to February 19, 1863, the department of the interior had to suppress more than 1100 agrarian riots. So, for instance, on the estate of Count Apraxine in the province of Kazan, the troops were called upon to bring to submission 5000 peasants, killing 55 and wounding 71. On the estate of M. Volkoff in the province of Pensa, the troops had to deal with 10,000 peasants, killing eight and wounding 26. How many tens of thousands of peasants were flogged and clubbed into "freedom" God alone knows. So, for instance, in M. Volkoff's village, to which we have just referred, 28 men were sent to forced labor in Siberia after receiving from 400 to 700 lashes with *Spitzruten*,¹ 80 men were exiled to Siberia after receiving 200 to 400 lashes with *Spitzruten*, three were sent to a penitentiary, three sentenced to punitive military service, 58 were flogged with rods without any further punishment.²

Ominous indeed was this forcible introduction of "freedom." For years the peasant was sure of the coming of that freedom which the tsar had announced. What was given to him as freedom, the popular mind reasoned, could not possibly be the

¹ This punishment was "running the gauntlet," or rather walking it. The offender was led between a double line of men armed with stout sticks and beaten as he passed.

² V. K. Semevski, *Krepostnoie pravo i krestianskaia reforma v proizvedeniakh* M. E. Saltikova, pp. 23, 24.

"true freedom," the tsar's freedom. The true freedom must have been withheld from the people by the nobility and the official class. And again the popular mind was not so far from the truth. True freedom was withheld from the people by the nobility and the officials, but the tsar was the first noble and the first official of his land.

II

The fundamental principles of the great reform act were, first, that the person of the serf was to be freed without compensation, and secondly, that the freed serf was to receive land allotments sufficient to provide for his needs and to allow him to meet his obligations towards the state. For the land allotted to him he was ultimately to pay. The government undertook to pay the former landlord, collecting the amount from the peasant but distributing the payment over a period of forty-nine years. The interests of the state of course required that the peasantry should be put on a sound economic footing. But on the other hand it is to be remembered, that a "state" is not an abstract idea, and that in reality all the agents of the state—*i. e.*, all those who held official positions, central or local, all those who were called upon to draft the abolition law and all those who were afterwards commissioned to carry out the law and put it into practice—belonged to the nobility, the class of serf-owing landlords.

Of course the Russian nobility did not represent one solid, homogeneous, selfish body. There were among them most unselfish individuals, some of whom were men of influence; there were others who, while on the whole favoring their own class, were broadminded enough to have the interests of the state and those of the peasantry at heart too. Such men were favored by the tsar. Many of them had a great deal to do with the work of the emancipation. But the vast bulk of the nobility cared for nothing but its own interests and was striving either to checkmate the reform or so to frame it that the landlord and not the peasant should be benefited by the new law.

The final draft of the abolition law was a compromise between these different tendencies within the higher bureaucracy, and the interests of the nobility were only too well taken care of.

The abolition act itself is too complicated and too technical to be of interest to the American reader.¹ In brief this act and the supplementary laws established the following situation:

The serf of yesterday was not made free, but put in a transitional state. For the first two years the peasants were "to remain in their former obedience to their landlords and fulfil their former obligations without dispute." It should be remembered that within these first two years, when the peasants were to remain in absolute obedience to their landlords, the final arrangements and settlements of land matters between the landlords and the peasantry were to take place.

After these two years the peasants were put into "temporarily obligatory" relations, which were to last so long as the landlords were not paid in full for the land allotments of the peasantry. While the peasants were in this "temporarily obligatory" state, the landlord was to have the right of police, the right to dismiss the elected officers of the peasant community, the right of vetoing all decisions of the peasant meeting, the right of expelling any peasant whom he regarded as a bad influence. All his rights in part or as a whole the landlord could transfer to any other person by giving him a power of attorney.²

The peasant received the permanent use of his homestead and a certain allotment of arable land and pasture, for which he was to pay a certain rent to the landlord. The maximum and minimum size of the land allotment and the rent for the payments were fixed by law, but room was left for voluntary arrangements between peasant and landlord. By arrangements with the peasants the landlord could also grant them one-fourth of the land norm as a gift without any payment on the peasant's part. The payments for the land allotments were largely fixed on the basis of what the peasants paid in the days of serfdom.³ In

¹ For a brief account of the abolition work see Simkhovitch, "Die Bauernbefreiung in Russland," in Conrad's *Handwörterbuch für Staatswissenschaften*, 2d ed., vol. ii, pp. 399-423.

² Druzhinin, *Youridicheskoe polozhenie krestian* (St. Petersburg, 1897), p. 59.

³ See Professor Ivanyoukoff, *Padenie krepostnago prava* (St. Petersburg, 1882), p. 289. Also Simkhovitch, *Die Feldgemeinschaft in Russland* (Jena, 1898), pp. 239-246.

addition the following principle was introduced: the smaller the allotment, the higher the rate of payment. It was an application of the marginal theory of value. It was claimed that the peasant could use the first dessiatine of land to greater advantage than the second, that he would exploit the second dessiatine more thoroughly than the third, and so on. Accordingly the payments on the first dessiatines were higher than on the subsequent ones. The result was that the less land the peasant had, *i. e.* the poorer he was, the higher was his rate of payment. The difference was very substantial, varying from 51.5 per cent to 88.1 per cent.¹

It is proper to consider as a part of the abolition act the great bond issue, through which the government paid off the landlords, taking over the peasant indebtedness, in return for which the peasant was to pay a redemption tax for forty-nine years. This and all other taxes were collected by the government from the village commune, the members of which were severally and jointly responsible for the taxes.

Still more than by the law itself was the nobility favored by its enforcement and execution. The peasantry was cheated in all sorts of petty ways with the connivance and help of the local administration, and the allotments were as a rule so arranged as to make the peasantry dependent upon the landlord's estate.

Small wonder therefore that it took military force to make the peasant recognize the newly granted freedom. His landholdings were diminished, his payments if anything increased, and as to his freedom of person, it is hardly fair to blame him for not perceiving it. In the past he could not leave his place without permission of his master; now he could not leave it without the permission of the authorities. He was given land, which was not his own, but which belonged to the village community. He could not say to the authorities: "Keep your land and let me go." Too many would have liked to do that, if they could! The taxes on the land exceeded two, three, four, six and occasionally ten times all it could possibly pro-

¹ Khodski, *Zemlia i zemledelec*, vol. ii, p. 29.

duce. He was under obligation to take the land, and he could leave it only on the condition that he was to pay the taxes. In the past he was subject to personal violence on the part of the landlord, who could flog him if he saw fit. Now he was flogged on the decision of the village court or, without any decision, at pleasure or leisure of any petty police official.

Later, in 1889, Alexander III created a new body of officials, who combined absolute judicial and administrative powers. These were the *zemskie nachalniki*, the rural commanders. They were appointed from the local landlord class without any educational qualifications. These officials had absolute power over the peasantry in their districts. They flogged the peasants for not taking off their hats, for not turning out on the road, for talking loud and in fact for anything they pleased. Mr. Beer, a *zemski nachalnik* himself, published commentaries on the law of 1889 which became the standard guide of his fellow commanders. In these commentaries we read the following recommendation, intended to prevent the occasional chopping of fire wood in the landlords' forests:

Nobody shall leave the village at night without presenting himself personally to the selectman (*selski starosta*) or to one acting in his place. Nobody shall leave the village at night at all, or in the day time for more than twenty-four hours without reporting to the selectman where he is going and for what purpose. For any departure without permission the guilty one shall be punished. Any one who departs at night is to be reported in the morning by the watchmen and sentinels to the selectman, who is to inquire into the matter and punish disobedience, even if it be proven that there was nothing suspicious or improper in the departure.¹

Does such a commentary need any further comment?

When therefore, four years ago, the government organized the great agricultural inquest, with 400 local sub-committees, in the proceedings of which 11,000 men took part, the chief recommendation of these committees was that

in order to be economically active and enterprising, the rural popula-

¹ Beer, *Kommentarii k uchrezhdeniam 12 Yulya 1889 g.*, pp. 69, 70.

tion must secure for itself certain rights, which would guarantee its work against encroachments, and it must also know that it is entitled to defend its rights.¹

III

The defects of the abolition law and the effects of bureaucratic oppression became evident as early as in the sixties of the past century. The official statistics had to acknowledge the sad facts. Commissions and committees to investigate and to deliberate *etc.* were appointed. And while they accomplished nothing of practical benefit to the peasantry, valuable and interesting statistical and other material has been published from time to time by such commissions and other organs of the government.

Basing his work on the reports of the commission for inquiry into the agricultural situation, on the publications of the tax commission and on some other official statistical publications, Professor Y. Janson published in 1877 his remarkable book on peasant land allotments and taxes. This has been universally recognized as a most accurate piece of investigation. We shall therefore quote a few data from it. Professor Janson tells us that wherever an accurate estimate has been made of the productivity of the land allotments, the taxes exceeded the productivity. For instance in the province of Novgorod the peasantry can be divided into four groups, with the following relations of land-tax to land-income:

The former crown peasants	100 per cent.
The former appanage peasants	161 per cent.
The former private peasants	180 per cent.
Peasants in "temporarily obligatory" relations	210 per cent.

In certain districts the tax occasionally amounts to 565 per cent of the land income. According to the calculations of the St. Petersburg zemstvo the relation of the tax and redemption

¹ I take this quotation from Professor Milyoukov's excellent book, *Russia and its Crisis*, 1905. "Instead of that," adds Prof. Milyoukov, p. 447, "the peasant is now powerless against the whims of the local authorities; his economic activity is under strict control; his person, his property and his family are dependent upon the arbitrary decisions of the mir; he may at any time be arrested and flogged."

payments to the land income varies from 128 to 150.5 per cent. In the province of Moscow it averages 205 per cent; in Tver, 244 to 252 per cent; in Smolensk, 166 to 220 per cent; in Kostroma, 146 to 240 per cent; in Pskoff, 130 to 213 per cent; in Vladimir, 168 to 276 per cent; in Viatka, 97 to 200 per cent, *etc.*¹

A tax on land that exceeds the income of the land is an absurdity, one would say. Certainly, but what was actually intended was a modified form of serfdom. The peasant became the serf of the state; the state took from him all the land could possibly produce and, besides, a very large share of what the peasant could gain outside by plying a trade or by hiring himself out. The land tax therefore swallowed the major part of the wages of the peasant as a factory hand, blacksmith, river driver, wood-chopper, farm hand and what not.

The zemstvo statistical bureau of the province of Novgorod gives the following detailed statistical account of the total income of the peasants of that province and of the relation of their income to their taxes. One-third of all the men and two-thirds of all the women of the peasantry have to work on the farm the whole year round and therefore bring in no outside income. The sum total of the outside earnings of the peasantry of the province amounts to 8,855,100 rubles, and is brought in by the following earning groups:

One-third of all male adults (63,700) working out the whole year	3,184,950
One-half of the minors and one-third of the female adults working out the whole year	2,275,850
One-third of the male adults and one-half of the minors working out during the winter	1,228,500
Winter work of the horses	2,165,800
	8,855,100

The food deficit which was occasioned by the insufficiency of the land allotments, and which had to be covered from the outside income. amounted to over three million rubles. Taxes

¹ Yanson, *Opyt statisticheskago izsledovania o krestianskikh nadelakh i platezhakh* (2d ed, St. Petersburg, 1881), pp. 35, 36.

amounted to 3,278,136 rubles. There remains about two and a-half millions, *i. e.* about 12 rubles 65 kopeks in each peasant household, out of which amount all the necessities of life, such as salt, clothing, shoes, *etc.*, as well as the repairs and purchase of agricultural implements, must be covered.

The situation in many provinces was much worse and in few better.¹ On the whole it was such that Professor Yanson comes to the conclusion that the peasantry was economically better off during the period of serfdom.²

If that was the situation created by the reform, and if the taxes were actually collected, *i. e.* clubbed out of the peasant, then it was obvious that the peasant class in Russia was doomed. If the peasant's horse and cow were to be sold for tax arrears, then it was obvious that the peasant's situation was bound to become more desperate from year to year. Yet it is doubtful if, in the first decade after the abolition act, anybody thought that the peasantry would be brought by the tsar's government to the point of physical deterioration, of perpetual famine, of slow death by starvation. That, however, is precisely what his majesty's government has accomplished.

On November 16, 1901, a new agricultural investigating commission was appointed by the tsar. This commission published four volumes of statistical data relating to the welfare of the peasantry and allied subjects. Russian official data generally paint the situation in a more rosy light than the facts warrant. But let us give them in this case the benefit of the doubt and assume that the situation is not worse than that acknowledged by the governmental commission. One of the chapters of the commission's report opens as follows:

The quantity of farm stock is one of the chief indices of the welfare of the population in agricultural countries. Without farm stock agriculture is impossible even in countries where agricultural machines are generally used; and this is still more true in our fatherland where agricultural machinery has not yet found such general application. The farm stock statistics are therefore very significant for the explanation of the economic status of our peasantry. The quantity of such

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75.

stock indicates the state of agriculture as well as the welfare of the agricultural population. Besides its service as working power, it counteracts the natural exhaustion of the soil, it serves as material for food, for clothing, for harness, *etc.*, and thus becomes of cumulative importance in the whole national economy.¹

The accompanying tables show us how well the Russian peasantry is supplied with farm stock.

TABLE I²

REGIONS	YEARS	FARM STOCK			FARM HORSES	
		PER 1000 DESSIATINES FARM LAND	PER 1000 SOULS OF POPULATION	PER 1000 FARMS	PER 1000 SOULS OF POPULATION	PER 1000 FARMS
1. Northern	1870	344	1,051	6,170	197	1,158
	1880	357	965	5,669	181	1,062
	1890	341	950	5,589	199	1,169
	1900	306	925	5,407	145	846
2. North-Eastern . . .	1870	607	1,364	8,371	262	1,608
	1880	560	1,182	7,213	244	1,488
	1890	456	1,043	6,408	223	1,372
	1900	492	1,144	6,902	189	1,145

¹ Materiali visochaishe uchrezhdennoi 16 Noiabria 1901 g. komissii, part iii (St. Petersburg, 1903), p. 209.

² *Ibid.* part i, pp. 210, 221. In giving the data I follow the governmental publication and subdivide Russia into "regions." It may perhaps be well to point out which provinces are included in each region:

Northern provinces: Arkhangelsk, Oloneck, Vologda, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Pskoff.

North-Eastern provinces: Viatka, Perm.

Eastern provinces: Ufa, Orenburg, Samara.

South-Eastern provinces: Astrakhan, Territory of the Don Kosaks.

Central Volga provinces: Nishni-Novgorod, Kazan, Simbirsk.

Central agricultural provinces:

(a) *The Eastern group:* Penza, Saratoff, Tamboff, Voronesh, Kharkoff.

(b) *The Western group:* Kursk, Orel, Tula, Ryazan.

Central industrial provinces: Vladimir, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Tver, Moscow, Kaluga, Smolensk.

Baltic provinces: Curland, Livonia, Estonia.

North-Western provinces: Vitebsk, Mohilev, Minsk, Vilno, Kovno, Grodno.

South-Western provinces: Volhynia, Kieff, Podolia.

Ruthenian provinces: Poltava, Tchernigov.

Bessarabian provinces: Yekaterinoslav, Tauris, Kherson, Bessarabia.

TABLE I—*Continued.*

REGIONS	YEARS	FARM STOCK			FARM HORSE	
		PER 1000 DESIATINES FARM LAND	PER 1000 SOULS OF POPULATION	PER 1000 FARMS	PER 1000 SOULS OF POPULATION	PER 1000 FARMS
3. Eastern	1870	295	1,829	11,260	376	2,315
	1880	294	1,551	9,558	349	2,153
	1890	299	1,316	8,103	269	1,657
	1900	357	1,357	8,360	251	1,549
4. South-Eastern . . .	1870	701	4,018	22,660	219	1,235
	1880	692	3,172	17,815	108	945
	1890	686	2,697	15,143	151	852
	1900	635	2,223	12,396	132	738
5. Central Volga . . .	1870	666	1,134	6,761	213	1,270
	1880	630	932	5,563	177	1,055
	1890	645	889	5,325	154	977
	1900	581	748	4,415	134	796
6. Central Agricultural (a) Eastern group .	1870	972	1,638	11,221	236	1,616
	1880	841	1,210	8,289	179	1,228
	1890	892	1,182	8,105	183	1,259
	1900	825	1,040	7,011	137	923
(b) Western group .	1870	872	1,147	7,828	224	1,526
	1880	919	1,045	7,129	192	1,313
	1890	895	948	6,469	193	1,314
	1900	848	834	5,680	124	843
7. Central Industrial . .	1870	473	909	5,386	195	1,156
	1880	489	873	5,176	177	1,051
	1890	469	823	4,887	179	1,062
	1900	487	806	4,782	139	825
8. Baltic	1870	1863	1,394	10,586	140	1,128
	1880	1155	1,182	8,983	153	1,160
	1890	980	1,059	8,011	151	1,148
	1900	1001	1,154	8,796	102	774
9. North-Western . . .	1870	798	1,469	11,710	190	1,518
	1880	941	1,369	10,975	195	1,563
	1890	912	1,220	9,690	180	1,433
	1900	859	1,105	8,788	126	1,000
10. South-Western . . .	1870	1035	1,193	8,312	118	820
	1880	1110	1,056	7,363	152	1,059
	1890	1153	1,925	6,999	174	1,252
	1900	998	764	5,357	116	818
11. Ruthenian	1870	1116	1,343	7,925	128	759
	1880	1150	1,156	6,835	139	821
	1890	1066	1,114	6,582	147	869
	1900	851	875	5,202	116	693
12. Bessarabian	1870	964	2,561	14,846	102	590
	1880	917	1,983	11,544	117	680
	1890	788	1,586	9,209	111	462
	1900	651	1,086	6,070	148	828
In the 50 provinces of European Russia . . .	1870	664	1,456	9,329	169	1,329
	1880	655	1,238	8,345	183	1,220
	1890	631	1,135	7,294	187	1,180
	1900	602	1,026	6,474	145	920

TABLE II.¹

REGIONS	YEARS	PERCENTAGE OF FARMS			
		WITHOUT HORSES	WITH ONE HORSE	WITH TWO HORSES	WITH THREE OR MORE HORSES
1. Northern	1882	18.			
	1888-91	16.3	44.2	24.7	14.8
	1893-96	18.0	47.5	23.7	10.8
2. North-Eastern . . .	1882	12.7			
	1888-91	18.1	34.7	21.9	25.3
	1893-96				
3. Eastern	1882	12.8			
	1888-91	18.2	24.6	18.3	38.9
	1893-96	24.7	25.8	17.7	31.8
4. South-Eastern . . .	1882	29.8			
	1888-91	41.5	29.1	16.8	12.6
	1893-96	38.5	28.9	16.9	15.7
5. Central Volga . . .	1882	22.7			
	1888-91	27.6	35.5	21.0	15.9
	1893-96	33.6	39.3	17.6	9.5
6. Central Agricultural					
(a) Eastern group. .	1882	27.1			
	1888-91	28.1	27.9	19.9	24.1
	1893-96	35.3	32.4	17.5	14.8
(b) Western group. .	1882	23.1			
	1888-91	23.4	24.1	22.3	30.2
	1893-96	29.4	29.5	21.1	20.0
7. Central Industrial . .	1882	22.5			
	1888-91	22.0	41.5	21.7	14.8
	1893-96	24.4	44.0	20.0	11.6
8. Baltic	1882				
	1888-91	7.5	32.8	21.3	38.4
	1893-96	8.1	33.6	22.0	36.3
9. North-Western . . .	1882	17.9			
	1888-91	16.6	37.9	24.1	21.4
	1893-96	16.5	41.1	24.2	18.2
10. South-Western . . .	1882	50.8			
	1888-91	51.0	5.1	24.6	19.3
	1893-96	55.1	5.4	24.0	15.5
11. Ruthenian	1882	46.4			
	1888-91	44.0	22.4	16.6	17.0
	1893-96	45.0	24.2	16.9	13.9
12. Bessarabian	1882	39.6			
	1888-91	39.7	9.6	30.2	20.5
	1891-96	34.6	7.9	30.1	27.4
Throughout the 50 provinces of European-Russia	1882	26.9			
	1888-91	27.8	28.6	21.9	21.7
	1891-96	32.2	29.1	21.2	17.5

We see that there has been a decrease of live stock on the peasants' farms. This decrease is ominously large; it amounts

¹ Materiali, *etc.*, part i, p. 211.

to 30.8 per cent within thirty years. In 1870 there were 9329 heads on each 1000 farms; in 1900, there were only 6474.¹ Just as great is the decrease of farm horses. One thousand farms had in 1870, 1329 horses; in 1900, 920.² Still greater is the decrease of pigs and sheep and other small stock on Russian farms. There were, in 1870, 5469 heads on each 1000 farms; in 1900, only 3459, a decrease of 36.8 per cent. Our official documents acknowledge the fact of the gradual decrease of farm stock, greatly diminishing the economic power of the population. "The number of farms without horses increased, as did the number of farms with an insufficient supply of horses. At the same time we see a decrease in the number of farms with two or three horses, *i. e.*, in the more stable and better provided farms."³ Under Russian farming conditions, a farm without horses is no more a farm than a knife without a blade is a knife. Now we have seen, from the incomplete statistical data which the government gives us, that the percentage of horseless farms throughout Russia increased in the short period of 1882-1896 from 26.9 to 32.2.

More considerable than the decrease in farm stock is the diminution in the land allotments of the Russian peasantry. In the days of serfdom, the law required that the serfs should work but three days for their master. This law was not always enforced; the peasantry as a rule worked more than half of their time on the landlords' fields. The allotments of the peasantry in the days of serfdom were barely large enough to keep them alive. When serfdom was abolished the land allotments of the peasantry were considerably decreased. The village community, with its periodical land divisions and allotments, and the government's policy of keeping the surplus population on the land, for fear of creating a politically enlightened city proletariat, had the natural effect of decreasing the already insufficient land allotments in proportion to the natural increase of population.

The primary care of the Russian government has been the preservation of absolutism, and all measures, economic or

¹ *Materiali, etc.*, part iii, p. 212.

² *Ibid.*, part iii, p. 213.

³ *Ibid.*, part iii, p. 216.

educational, have been controlled by this consideration. The illiteracy of the peasants was treasured as the most precious jewel in the imperial crown; and as to the village community, Count Kisseleff, who for twenty years was engaged in shaping the destinies of Russia's peasantry, frankly admitted that

the periodical land divisions, which are so pernicious for any far-reaching farming improvement, have their bright side in not permitting the development of a proletariat. The village community, therefore, is a problem, the solution of which lies outside of purely economic considerations.¹

And Count Kisseleff acted accordingly. He forced the village community upon not less than 533,201 peasants who had never known this institution before.² M. Yermoloff, who till recently was the secretary of agriculture, has himself expressed the opinion that the peasant's right to land allotment in the village community system means, with the constantly decreasing size of the allotment, only the right to die of starvation.

The table on the following page shows the average decrease of the peasant land allotments in the fifty provinces of European Russia.

Small as these peasant land holdings are, they might have been sufficient in a country where education, self-reliance and honest work are encouraged. But not so in the empire of the tsar, where almost every educated man is suspected as a political criminal and where the education of the peasant has been systematically suppressed. About the suppression of education and the arrest of the mental development of the peasantry, about the government's almost insane craving for the preservation of ignorance, volumes could be written. Here a single characteristic fact must suffice us. Russia's censorship has excluded from general reading books like Spencer's works, Bryce's *American Commonwealth* and Fyffe's *History of Europe*. No books have been printed without the authorization of the

¹ Zablocki-Dessyatkovski, Count P. D. Kisseleff and his times (St. Petersburg, 1882), vol. ii, p. 199.

² Simkhovitch, *Die Feldgemeinschaft in Russland* (Jena, 1898), pp. 70, 71.

TABLE III¹

REGIONS	NUMBER DESSIATINES TO EACH MALE PEASANT		
	1860	1880	1900
1. Northern	7.6	6.1	4.7
2. North-Eastern	8.1	6.1	4.6
3. Eastern	9.5	6.5	4.8
4. South-Eastern	8.4	5.2	3.5
5. Central Volga	4.0	3.1	2.4
6. Central Agricultural.			
(a) Eastern group	4.1	3.0	2.2
(b) Western group	3.0	2.2	1.7
7. Central Industrial.	4.0	3.3	2.6
8. Baltic.	3.7	2.9	2.4
9. North-Western	5.0	3.3	2.2
10. South-Western.	2.9	2.1	1.4
11. Ruthenian.	3.3	2.5	1.7
12. Bessarabian	6.2	4.0	2.5
Throughout the 50 provinces of European Russia	4.8	3.5	2.6

censor. Of books permitted by the censor and actually on sale there are about 90,000. But of these books only about 2500 are allowed to be placed in village libraries, *i. e.*, about three per cent of the books admitted to general circulation.²

The constant moral, physical and economic oppression of the reigning bureaucracy has left the people no chance for progress and every chance for starvation. And the Russian people is starving. The statistical publications of the commission appointed November 16, 1901, to which I have so frequently referred, give figures which are supposed to show in how far the productivity of the peasant land is sufficient or deficient for feeding the peasant population and the farm horses, assuming that the peasant pays no taxes. Since the Russian peasant lives almost entirely on a vegetarian diet, it is estimated that he consumes in a year 20 *pud* of field products, and each farm horse is allowed 40 *pud* of oats. On this basis we find the following local deficits and surpluses:

¹ Materiali, *etc.*, part i, pp. 78, 79.

² See Milyoukov, *Russia and its Crisis*, p. 202.

TABLE IV ¹

REGION	FIELD PRODUCTS PER SOUL OF POPULATION			OATS PER FARM-HORSE		
	TOTAL (in pud)	OVER (+) OR UNDER (—) THE NORM OF 20 PUD		TOTAL (in pud)	OVER (+) OR UNDER (—) THE NORM OF 40 PUD	
		(in pud)	(in per- centage)		(in pud)	(in per- centage)
Northern	9.7	—10.3	—51.5	27.5	—12.5	—31
North-Eastern	15.9	—4.1	—20.5	46.0	+6.0	+15
Eastern	25.3	+5.3	+26.5	20.1	—19.9	—50
South-Eastern	24.5	+4.5	+22.5	11.4	—28.6	—72
Central Volga	15.8	—4.2	—21.0	33.6	—6.4	—16
Central Agricultural.						
(a) Eastern Group	17.7	—2.3	—11.5	21.3	—18.7	—47
(b) Western Group	12.0	—8.0	—40.0	28.5	—11.5	—29
Central Industrial	10.8	—9.2	—46.0	25.4	—14.6	—37
Baltic	15.5	—4.5	—22.5	34.2	—5.8	—15
North-Western	12.4	—7.6	—38.0	17.6	—22.4	—56
South-Western	13.7	—6.3	—31.5	22.3	—17.7	—44
Ruthenian	13.5	—6.5	—32.5	12.1	—27.9	—70
Bessarabian	37.8	+17.8	+89.0	5.8	—34.2	—86
Throughout the 50 prov- inces of European Russia	16.6	—3.4	—17.0	23.6	—16.4	—41

These data show the most curious anomaly ever known in the economy of any country. Russia's rural, agricultural population is not a seller but a buyer of agricultural products.

A most thorough and admirable investigation undertaken in the nineties,² in which the allowances for food and fodder were smaller than in the recent governmental publication, showed the Russian peasantry divided into three groups. The first group, which had not sufficient grain for subsistence, numbered 45,358,078 peasants, or 70.7 per cent of the peasantry. The second, which had enough grain for subsistence but not enough for fodder, numbered 13,083,410 or 20.4 per cent. The third, which had a surplus in grain for both purposes, numbered 5,715,513 or 8.9 per cent.

It must be borne in mind that these data refer simply to the

¹ Materiali, *etc.*, part i, p. 89, part iii, pp. 164, 165.

² Tchuproff and Posnikoff, *Vlianie urozhaev i khlebnikh cen.* vol. i, pp. vi-ix, 1-96.

productivity of the peasant land in relation to the physiological necessities of the peasant. But before feeding himself and his horse the peasant is called upon to feed the state. The peasant is the chief taxpayer of the state, and his majesty's government has been fed, not on any surplus of oats or grain, but on the life and blood of the Russian peasant. Under these circumstances it cannot surprise us to learn that the peasant class is physically degenerating and deteriorating from year to year. This deterioration is indicated by governmental statistics showing the number of those freed from military service on physical grounds. In Russia, as the reader doubtless knows, every male citizen twenty-one years old is subject to military service, unless rejected on account of disease, insufficient height or other physical defect. Inasmuch, however, as the army has grown more rapidly than the country's population, men who would have been rejected some years ago are now pressed into service. It follows that the increase of the percentage of the rejected does not fully express the people's physical deterioration; the situation is worse than the figures indicate, although these are gruesome enough.

TABLE V¹
PERCENTAGE OF RECRUITS REJECTED FOR PHYSICAL DEFECTS

PROVINCES	1874-83	1884-93	1894-01	1874-83	1884-93	1894-01
Northern				6.9	9.4	12.7
Arkhangelsk.	7.8	8.4	9.2			
Oloneck	6.4	6.0	7.7			
Vologda	5.8	12.2	16.5			
St. Petersburg	10.7	13.2	15.5			
Novgorod.	6.4	6.4	9.1			
Pskoff	5.0	7.6	12.4			
North-Eastern				6.6	9.2	9.6
Viatka	5.1	10.4	10.2			
Perm.	8.2	7.8	8.8			
Eastern.				5.7	8.6	10.8
Ufa	7.8	12.1	13.0			
Orenburg	5.8	6.4	10.5			
Samara.	4.1	6.7	8.9			
South-Eastern				4.1	4.7	6.9
Astrakhan.	3.9	4.7	7.9			
Territory of the Don- Kosaks.	4.4	4.7	6.5			

¹ Materials, *etc.*, vol. i, pp. 27-33.

TABLE V—*Continued*

PROVINCES	1874-83	1884-93	1894-01	1874-83	1884-93	1894-01
Central Volga				5.8	6.2	10.2
Nizhni-Novgorod.	4.4	5.2	5.3			
Kazan	7.5	6.4	14.0			
Simbirsk	4.7	6.7	9.4			
Central Agricultural.						
Eastern group				6.3	6.8	9.0
Penza	4.9	5.3	8.2			
Saratoff.	5.8	5.8	7.6			
Tomhoff	6.1	7.0	8.1			
Voronezh	6.7	8.0	11.0			
Kharkoff	7.7	7.0	9.5			
Western group.				5.3	6.8	10.4
Kursk	5.7	5.6	8.7			
Orel	4.9	6.5	10.4			
Tula	4.8	6.6	11.1			
Ryazan.	5.7	8.8	12.2			
Central Industrial.				5.8	8.8	10.4
Vladimir	4.7	5.2	8.4			
Kostroma.	6.8	12.1	12.9			
Yaroslav	4.7	9.2	13.5			
Tver.	6.1	7.9	10.7			
Moscow	7.1	11.9	11.1			
Kaluga.	6.6	7.7	5.9			
Smolensk	4.1	7.2	12.2			
Baltic				10.1	9.3	11.7
Curland.	7.3	9.3	11.8			
Livonia.	10.6	9.0	12.7			
Esthonia	13.4	10.1	8.2			
North-Western.				7.5	6.9	9.5
Vitebsk.	9.7	5.6	8.5			
Mohilev.	7.8	9.1	11.6			
Minsk	7.9	6.7	7.8			
Vilno.	6.8	6.8	10.2			
Kovno	8.9	8.8	11.5			
Grodno.	4.1	4.5	8.1			
South-Western.				7.0	8.3	11.0
Volhynia	8.1	10.7	10.4			
Kieff.	6.2	8.0	11.8			
Podolia.	6.8	6.1	10.8			
Ruthenian.				7.2	8.5	13.7
Poltava.	7.2	8.7	14.1			
Tchernigoff	7.2	8.3	13.2			
Bessarabian				6.2	6.4	8.9
Ekaterinoslav	5.4	6.1	11.0			
Tauris	6.6	5.7	7.2			
Kherson	6.1	7.1	7.9			
Bessarabia.	7.0	6.7	9.0			
Throughout the 50 provinces of European Russia	6.4	7.7	10.3	6.4	7.7	10.3

IV

The Russian peasant has become a serf of the state. This is not a figure of speech. The local agricultural committees appointed by the government did not hesitate to point out this fact in discussing the legal disabilities of the peasantry and the taxes resting upon the peasant class. Especially clearly and forcibly did the district committees of Balashov and Borovitchi express themselves. The excessive property tax cannot be covered by the income from agriculture, and it is therefore shifted upon the person of the peasant. Then come the specific "personal services" (*naturalnia povinnosti*) consisting in personal work and in furnishing horses at the command of the local authorities.¹

The direct taxes by no means represent the whole amount paid by the peasant to the treasury; where the direct taxes stop, the indirect taxes—excise taxes and the protective tariff—begin and put their finishing touches on the peasant budget.

Let us take a minutely itemized budget of a peasant household. The total yearly budget amounts to 390 rubles and 21 kopeks. In this budget will be found the following items:

<i>Supplies</i>	<i>Cost</i>	<i>Including taxes</i>
Vodka	29 rubles 10 kopeks	21 rubles
Sugar	26 " 86 "	7 "
Tea	21 " 11 "	10 " 40 kopeks
Cotton goods	10 " 89 "	3 " 80 "
Cloth	6 " 40 "	?
Kerosene oil	4 " 51 "	1 " 50 "
Tobacco	1 " 68 "	30 "
Matches	65 "	31 "
	101 rubles 20 kopeks	44 rubles 21 kopeks

In spending 101 rubles and 20 kopeks the peasant pays 44 rubles and 21 kopeks in indirect taxes. This amount does not represent the total amount of indirect taxation paid by the peasant household, since it is impossible in the nature of the case to analyze some of the entries.²

¹ I. M. Strakhovski, *Krestianski vopros*, in *Nuzhdi derevni*, vol. i, p. 115.

² Annenski in *Nuzhdi derevni*, vol. ii, p. 559.

But the peasant has not only become a serf of the state; he has remained in economic dependence on the landlord. "Freed" with insufficient allotments of land, overburdened with taxes, he was tied to his land. Migration was suppressed; the colonization of Siberia and other regions was practically prohibited till very recently, till it became a political necessity. Th. G. Terner, a member of the council of the empire, tells us frankly why the government was so hostile to the migration of peasants: it was because the landlords wanted cheap labor and tenants for their land.

Single individuals may sacrifice, out of higher motives, their own interests to the common weal; but the attitude of classes of population towards economic problems has been always and everywhere selfish. That is why the landlord class was hostile towards emigration; and since it was the most influential class, its attitude found expression in the tendencies of the government. What in the days of serfdom was a matter of course and a necessity, appeared after 1861 as an extremely dangerous affair, which not only was not to be encouraged but was to be suppressed by every means. The question of peasant migration was classed as a revolutionary one: no well-meaning, conservative man was to touch it.¹

In order to pay taxes which their own land allotments could not furnish, the peasants were obliged to rent the landlord's land. Since there was practically no competition on the side of the landlords and a wild competition on the part of the land-hungry peasantry, a situation arose which, so far as I know, is unparalleled in human history. There developed a peculiar tenant system, which may be called a contract-labor tenant system. The land is rented every year at an extremely high figure, which the peasant is not presumed to pay, but to work out on the landlord's estate. The peasant's work is priced extremely low, as a rule at about one-half of the prevailing wages. These obligations the peasant, as a matter of fact, can not meet, and his indebtedness to the landlord increases from year to year. "The peasant can never clear himself from indebtedness to the local landlord, and being so dependent on

¹ Terner, *Gosudarstvo i zemlevladienie*, vol. ii, pp. 119, 120.

the landlord, he is compelled to do all sorts of work.”¹ “Accordingly,” M. Lipski writes,

there can be no question that the renting of single dessiatines of land . . . is in the hands of the landlord a powerful means of lowering wages. . . . There can scarcely be any question as to the fact that the renting of single dessiatines in the province of Tambov has lost long ago its rental character ; it should now be looked upon as one of the very hardest forms of labor contract. At the same time it is perfectly clear what rôle is played by the land that is leased out in dessiatines. It is an instrument through which the free peasant becomes a serf, who is giving his labor on conditions dictated by want.²

But not only does the landlord in this way get field labor at a cost much lower than the cost of subsistence of the laborers, but he gets also the use of their farming stock at the same rate. The peasant as a rule is obliged to use his own farm horses on the landlord's estate—so much so that a very large percentage of estates have ceased keeping any farming stock, relying entirely upon the use of that of the peasants. An investigation dating back to the beginning of the nineties showed that the district of Tombov, for instance, had 26 per cent of estates without farming stock ; the district of Lebediansk, 33 per cent ; Kirsanov, 30 per cent ; Lipeck, 40 per cent, *etc.*³ The result is an extremely low productivity, not only of the peasant land but also of the noble estates. The peasant is often compelled to neglect his own fields to work on those of his landlord. But working with poor implements and half-starved horses, and being in a great hurry to get through with his task, the results are extremely unsatisfactory.

Not in one or two provinces of European Russia does this situation prevail : volumes could be filled with practically identical data relating to widely differing provinces and regions. Thus we hear from the provinces of Ryazan, of Podolia, of Kursk, of Tombov, of Vologda, of Ufa, the same story, varying

¹ Lipski, *Ceny na rabotchia ruki pri zablagovremennom naime, etc.*, 1902, pp. 107-109. Maslov, *Agrarny vopros v Rossii*, 1905, p. 259.

² Lipski, pp. 112-115.

³ Maslov, *Agrarny vopros, etc.*, pp. 260-268.

only in style. Of course if the publication is an official one it reads like an idyl. Here is a sample:

After thirty years of experience with free labor, but few landlords, and those only to some extent, use permanent hired help and their own farming stock. Most of the landlords hire local peasants together with their farming stock and implements. The landlords keep up the most intimate economic relations with the contingent of peasants who work on their estates during the farming season year in and year out. The best way of getting into such intimate relations with the peasants is to rent them land, essential and indispensable to them but of no special use to the landlords.¹

Is not this a charming picture?

A good illustration of the existing situation is given by Maslov. He tells us that for some time the peasants of Simbirsk and the neighboring provinces were running away from their lands and settling quietly as landless proletarians on the Cossack lands of Orenburg. They were hiring themselves out to the Cossacks as laborers. It goes without saying that they have not become "capitalists" in working on the Cossacks' fields, "but they would shake with fright when they saw Russia [*i. e.* European Russia] even in a dream."²

The renting out of lands is but one mode of securing contract labor. The other mode is that of bread usury.

As I have already pointed out, the great bulk of the Russian peasantry does not harvest enough grain to feed the household throughout the year. As a rule, the peasant has used up his harvest by November or December, and he is then obliged to get money or bread on any condition offered to him. He goes to the landlord, who advances him bread or money but puts him under contract as a laborer for the coming season. From the province of Ryazan we hear that the peasant's labor is pledged to the landlord for two or three years ahead, and at a fabulously low rate. In the autumn the landlord contracts for the peasant's labor at a rate which, on the average, is 47 to 50

¹ Sbornik statist. sved. po Tambovskoi gub., vol. xix, pp. 28, 29. Maslov, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

² Maslov, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

per cent lower than the current wages. In other words, the peasant pays on the bread or the money received from the landlord 47 to 50 per cent interest for half a year.¹ High provincial officials,² being questioned on the subject by the central government, reported all forms of field labor contracted for ahead of time as forms of forced labor, the economic conditions of the peasantry forcing them into the position of serfs. Not only are such contracts permitted by the government, but their specific performance is enforced and their breach is treated as a misdemeanor. Article 101 of the law of June 12, 1886, directs the police to bring to the landlord all contracted laborers who have failed to appear or who have left the landlord's fields before the work was completed. Such a runaway peasant makes himself liable to detention in jail for one month.

V

The manifesto of February 19, 1861, ended with these words: "Make the sign of the cross, ye orthodox people, and pray with us for the blessing of God upon your free labor, the pledge of your domestic happiness and of the public weal!" This beautiful sentiment was, however, but a figure of speech. The manifesto itself did not give to the peasantry the rights enjoyed in Russia by other classes of the population. It merely stated that "the serfs will receive in time all the rights of freemen." That time has never come; the peasant has never been made the equal of other men before the law. And every law promulgated since 1861 in regard to the peasantry has been class legislation. The abolition act modified the situation of the peasant, but it did not free him. The reform of 1861 was a compromise measure which improved the political situation of the peasant but made his economic situation worse. The legislation of Alexander III was reactionary to an extreme. To the legislation of the present reigning tsar, his majesty himself obviously ascribes no value or significance; for law has been abolished throughout the Empire. Order and obedience are maintained

¹ *Otcherki po krestianskomu voprosu*, edited by A. A. Manuiloff, vol. i, p. 54.

² In Tombov, Vologda and Ufa.

by Cossacks' whips and Gatling guns for men and women and burning torches for the farm houses. Cavour was mistaken when he said, "Any fool can govern a people by military law." Not any, and not all the time. Only a year ago one traveling through Russia and asking the peasants, "Whose are you?" would hear everywhere the answer, "So and so's," giving the name of the local rural commander (*zemski natchalnik*). To-day many a peasant will answer, "I shall be my own."

The economist who would regard the Russian peasant as freed from serfdom might just as plausibly claim that Russia has a constitutional form of government, guaranteeing the life and liberty of the citizens. He might call attention to the first article of the manifesto of October 17, 1905, which reads:

We make it the duty of the government to execute this our inflexible will:

(1) To give to the population the immovable foundations of civic liberty on the principles of actual inviolability of person, freedom of conscience, of speech, of public gatherings and unions.

But this manifesto has had no effect on the realities of Russian life. A cynical but frank Russian statesman, when asked about the matter, answered plainly: The manifesto imposes upon the government the duty to grant the people inviolability of person and all sorts of freedom; but has the government promulgated any such laws? It has not; and therefore the people of Russia can claim no inviolability of person nor any of the enumerated liberties.

Very similar in this respect was the manifesto of February 19, 1861. It promised to the peasantry "in time" all the rights of freemen. But the time has not come. And it is not so much the lack of land that has ruined the peasantry as class legislation, the oppression of the bureaucracy and the suppression of education.

Alexander II criticised the abolition of slavery in America because the negroes were freed without land. They received no land, but they received freedom. And which is now better situated from an economic point of view—the American negro or the Russian peasant? Is the negro starving? But famine now

prevails in Russia. The Russian press claims this famine to be more intense than even in 1891, when 650,000 people died of starvation. And there has not been a single year in the reign of Nicholas II when famine has not raged in some part of Russia. These famines are not the unavoidable calamities of nature, they are logical and necessary consequences of the economic and political position of the peasantry. To maintain autocracy, the zemstvo schools were antagonized by the government and the peasants were kept illiterate. To prevent the accumulation of a politically advanced city proletariat, the village community system was maintained and extended, and the peasants were tied to land allotments too large to be buried in but too small to live on. In the interest of the landed nobility, colonization of the peasantry was suppressed till it was too late. The peasant has fed the whole bureaucratic machinery; and whatever was left him by the tax-gatherer has been appropriated by the landlord.

But the end has come. Financially the régime has become insolvent. Ordinary expenditures can be met by foreign loans. The bankers will make profits; but the innocent public might as well invest in notes issued by Mme. Therèse Humbert as in bonds issued by the autocrat of all the Russias. Politically the present régime will have to deal with peasant insurrections for land and liberty. There can be no doubt that sporadic agrarian risings will be put down; that the long exhausted fields will be enriched by peasant blood; that peasant homesteads will be burned as they were burned seven centuries ago by the Tartars, and as they have been burned during the last year by the tsar's punitive expeditions. But there can be no doubt that in time the peasants will get all the rights of freemen. They will get those rights because they will take them. The government still commands the bayonets; but these are peasant bayonets, and they are beginning to waver because the peasants are beginning to think.

VLADIMIR G. SIMKHOVITCH.